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 Antitheses form the backbone of the European project. Intergovernmentalism versus 
federalism, enlargement versus containment - these are only some of the contradictory pairs 
that have informed the development of the European Union (EU). One of them, that between 
the economic and social elements of the Union might not have featured prominently in 
academic literature since the start of the European project but has certainly gained increasing 
momentum over time. Is the EU primarily an economic union, or could it also be a social one? 
What is the significance of the social market economy, the concept introduced by the Treaty 
of Lisbon? More specifically, how far should fundamental freedoms yield when confronted by 
social rights?  
 
These questions have occupied an important place in the Court of Justice’s (CJEU) 
jurisprudence, yet it was not until the so-called Laval Quartet series of cases that the CJEU’s 
approach provoked an overwhelmingly vivid debate. Not much has changed since then, at least 
not fundamentally, despite voices putting forward a reformulation of the balancing exercise. 
Subsequent case law has not managed to turn the tide, thereby showing that the CJEU was slow 
to pick up the developments that took place at the institutional level post-Lisbon, with the 
introduction of the social market economy paradigm, and the empowerment of the Charter, but 
also to respond to the critique of neoliberal deregulation that was promoted through the various 
bailout packages in crisis-hit Eurozone countries.  
 
This all-important issue was revisited by the CJEU in AGET Iraklis. The case concerned 
the compatibility of a Greek pre-authorization regime based – amongst other things – on 
                                                        





assessment criteria linked to employment and workers’ protection, with Directive 98/59/EC on 
collective redundancies1 and with the freedom of establishment contained in Article 49 TFEU. 
The result, interestingly enough, was two divergent analyses produced by the Advocate 
General and the CJEU respectively. The Advocate General easily side-lined any welfare 
consideration in the light of fundamental freedoms; the CJEU, on the other hand, adopted a 
much more socially infused approach, perhaps hinting at a departure from the Ancien Régime. 
This case note aims to shed some light on this disjunction, by firstly presenting the facts of the 
case, followed by summaries of Advocate General Wahl’s Opinion and the CJEU’s judgment 
respectively. 
 
§2. Factual and Legal Background 
 
 AGET Iraklis (AGET) is the brand leader for cement production in Greece, whose 
majority ownership was taken over by the multinational group Lafarge (now LafargeHolcim) 
in the early 2000s.2 The economic crisis impacted its activities, forcing it to send invitations 
for consultations between November 2011 and December 2012. With its decision of 25 March 
2013, Lafarge’s board of directors chose to permanently close the company’s plant in 
Chalkida.3 On that basis, two further letters were issued on 26 March 2013 and 1 April 2013, 
inviting the workers’ union to consultative meetings.4 In the absence of the union’s 
participation, on 16 April 2013 the company submitted a request for the approval of its 
redundancy plans to the Minister for Labour, Social Security and Welfare. 
 
 A prior authorization is required for collective redundancies according to Article 5(3) 
of Law No. 1387/1983,5 which implemented Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the 
laws relating to collective redundancies into Greek law, allowing the relevant Minister or 
prefect to intervene, by either extending the consultation period, or, as was the case here, by 
rejecting all or part of the proposed redundancies. In AGET’s case this request was denied by 
                                                        
1 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies. [1998] OJ L 225/16. 
2 LaFarge, ‘LaFarge in Greece’, http://www.lafarge.gr/wps/portal/gr/1_1_1-Cement.  
3 Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, EU:C:2016:972, para. 13-14; Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-
201/15 AGET Iraklis, EU:C:2016:429, para. 12-13. 
4 Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para. 15; Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, 
para. 14.  
5 (GR) Law No. 1387/1983 on the Control of Collective Redundancies and Other Provisions (Νόμος 




the Minister’s decision of 26 April 2013, for reasons related to the absence of plans in place 
for the affected workers in light of Greece’s high unemployment levels, and the lack of concrete 
evidence on the need to proceed with the redundancies.6  
 
AGET appealed the decision before the Greek Council of State, which chose to make 
a preliminary reference to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU, asking for the CJEU’s view on 
the compatibility of the prior authorization regime with Directive 98/59/EC and Articles 49 
and 63 TFEU.7 In its second question, the referring court sought guidance as to the suitability 
of the high unemployment levels and the overall impact of the on-going economic crisis in 
Greece, as overriding social reasons justifying any potential incompatibility between the 
national regime in place and the provisions of EU law cited supra.8  
 
§3. The Advocate General’s Opinion 
 
 In his Opinion, the Advocate General chose to give precedence to fundamental 
freedoms. He considered the provision of Greek law independent to the scheme laid down by 
Directive 98/59/EC and incompatible with the freedom of establishment. His analysis began 
by finding that Article 5(3) of the Greek law fell outside the scope of Directive 98/59, as it 
imposed substantive obligations through its prior authorization regime, affecting the 
employer’s decision to proceed with the redundancies.9 The fact that it fell outside the 
Directive’s remit, meant that it could not constitute a more favourable measure towards 
workers’ protection under Article 5 of the Directive,10 yet it could not be precluded by the 
Directive either.11 
 
 As the Directive was of no relevance, it was crucial to establish which of the two 
fundamental freedoms invoked, that of the free movement establishment or of capital, each 
enshrined in Articles 49 and 63 TFEU respectively, applied to the examined proceedings.12 It 
                                                        
6 Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para. 17-18. 
7 Ibid., para. 25. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para. 29-31. This was also affirmed in Case 
C-449/93 Rockfon, EU:C:1994:420, para. 21; and Case C-187/05 to C-190/05 Agorastoudis and Others, 
EU:C:2006:535, para. 35-36. 
10 Here, the Advocate General dismissed parallels between AGET and similar recent cases such as Case C-12/08 
Mono Car Styling, EU:C:2009:466 and Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron, EU:C:2013:521. 
11 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para 34. 




was easily asserted that the freedom of establishment covered the factual situation at issue, due 
to Lafarge’s position as the majority shareholder.13 It therefore followed that the prior 
authorization was liable to constitute a restriction on Article 49 TFEU, by interfering with the 
managerial decisions of an undertaking established in another Member State. Moreover it 
impeded the exercise of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter), which 
contains the ‘sister’ provision to Article 49 TFEU, that is the freedom to conduct a business.14 
 
 Having established that the national measure was capable of restricting the freedom of 
establishment, Advocate General Wahl subsequently examined whether this could be justified, 
by evaluating if ‘[it is] (…) applied in a non-discriminatory manner; [it is] (…) justified by 
overriding reasons in the public interest; [it is] (…) suitable for securing the attainment of the 
objective which they pursue; and [it does] (…) not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain that objective’.15 The first three were easily satisfied, making the fourth test of 
proportionality, stricto sensu, of paramount importance for the outcome of the case.16 To 
summarise, is workers’ protection compatible with the freedoms of establishment and the 
freedom to conduct a business?17 
 
 According to the Advocate General there was no place for the solidarity part of the 
Charter in the balancing exercise, as neither Article 27 nor 30 of the Charter were deemed 
relevant to the proceedings, and, in any case, they contained provisions that were ‘weaker’ in 
comparison to other parts of the Charter or the fundamental freedoms.18 Only limited deviations 
from the latter were permitted for social purposes,19 contrary to overzealous efforts that were 
already rejected by the CJEU.20 After all, in the realm of collective redundancies Directive 
98/59 aims to maintain the balance between workers’ protection and the employer’s right to 
downsize.21 
                                                        
13 Ibid., para. 36-44. The Advocate General also stated that ad majorem the freedom of establishment incorporates 
aspects of the free movement of capital. 
14 Ibid., para. 47-50. 
15 Ibid., para. 51. Applying essentially the proportionality-based test that was use in Case C-55/94 Gebhard, 
EU:C:1995:411, para. 37. 
16 Ibid., para. 53-56. 
17 Ibid., para. 57. 
18 Relying on Case C-176/12 AMS, EU:C:2014:2. 
19 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para. 61, 64. 
20 Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron, which concerned a case where over-implementation of a directive was found, 
by the CJEU, to jeopardize the freedom to conduct a business. 





 After those preliminary remarks, the proportionality test was applied to the 
justifications found in Article 5(3) of the Greek law. National economic interests cannot, a 
priori, justify any restriction to the freedom of establishment, as they embody only purely 
economic objectives, whereas the conditions existing in the labour market might lead to 
counter-productive scenarios.22 Neither can the situation of an undertaking justify such 
restrictions, as this would undermine the employer’s decision-making capacity.23 In addition, 
legal certainty as well as the consultation process might be jeopardized by the prior 
authorization regime, for which no elaborate defence was submitted by Greece, making it all 
the more difficult to ascertain whether it was intended to genuinely protect workers in a 
proportionate manner.24 In any case, ‘the idea of a balancing exercise is in fact a fallacy: 
protecting the workers concerned is not at odds with either the freedom of establishment or the 
freedom to conduct a business’.25  
 
 After finding that the national measure could not pass the proportionality test, the 
Advocate General examined the propriety of the argument surrounding the acute negative 
socio-economic impact of the crisis. As this was primarily economic in nature, this could not 
override the freedoms of establishment and the freedom to conduct a business, which have also 
been affected by the crisis.26 At this point, and before his concluding remarks, Advocate 
General Wahl offered one suggestion: in lieu of retaining over-protective measures, countries 
should conform to the - primarily deregulatory - best practices promoted by various institutions, 
in order to lure new business and stimulate economic growth.27 
 
§4. The Judgment 
 
 The judgment of the CJEU, although quite similar in structure to the Opinion of the 
Advocate General, presented noticeable differences, specifically by being more 
accommodating towards the case’s social aspects. At first, the CJEU more or less sided with 
the Advocate General, concluding that substantive conditions affecting the triggering of 
                                                        
22 Ibid., para. 66-69. 
23 Ibid., para. 70. 
24 Ibid., para. 71-73. The Advocate General found  that the Directive could adequately ensure that. 
25 Ibid., para. 74. 
26 Ibid., para. 78-79. 




collective redundancies, such as those contained in Article 5(3) of Law No. 1387/1983, did not 
fall within the scope of the Directive and thus could not be precluded by it, so long as its 
practical application was not rendered practically impossible.28 While AGET contended that 
the Greek law was liable to dilute the Directive’s objectives, the CJEU did not provide an 
answer to this, essentially leaving this matter for the Greek Council of State to determine.29  
 
 After proclaiming that the freedom of establishment was the more relevant of the two 
fundamental freedoms, the CJEU added that the Greek law might also constitute an obstacle to 
the freedom to conduct a business, as contained in Article 16 of the Charter.30 Both freedoms 
can be limited by overriding reasons of public interest, an issue that was conceptually set out 
in a very similar, albeit not identical manner to Advocate General Wahl’s Opinion.  
 
 At this point, the CJEU undertook a preliminary assessment of the overriding reasons 
of public interest in relation to the prior-authorization regime.31 The first reason invoked, 
namely that of the interests of the national economy, was dismissed on the basis of the CJEU’s 
settled jurisprudence.32 Notwithstanding that, the remaining two reasons of workers’ protection 
and the promotion of employment, had already been acknowledged as legitimate justifications 
by the pertinent case-law, leading the CJEU to the same outcome.33 At this stage, the judgment 
and the Advocate General’s Opinion begin to diverge. In the following paragraphs, the CJEU 
highlighted the importance of social objectives, which have been incorporated in the Treaties 
as quasi-equal counterparts of the internal market,34 against whose freedoms they need to be 
                                                        
28 Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para. 27-41. Although one should note the CJEU’s more detailed reasoning, 
invoking Article 5 of Directive 98/59 on the ability of the Member States to adopt more favourable measures 
towards workers in para. 32 coupled with the introduction of the words ‘in principle’ in para. 33. 
29 Ibid., para. 42-43. 
30 Ibid., para. 45-70. 
31 Ibid., para. 71. 
32 Ibid., para. 72. 
33 Ibid., para. 73-75. The CJEU cited the following case law in relation to the protection of workers: Joined Cases 
C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others, EU:C:1999:575, para. 36; Case C-411/03 SEVIC Systems, 
EU:C:2005:762, para. 28; and Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union, EU:C:2007:772, para. 77. In relation to the promotion of employment and recruitment, the CJEU cited 
Case C-208/05 ITC, EU:C:2007:16, para. 38, 39; Case C-385/05 Confédération générale du travail and Others, 
EU:C:2007:37, para. 28; and Case C-379/11 Caves Krier Frères, EU:C:2012:798, para. 51. 
34 Found in Article 3(3) TEU and the objectives of a social market economy, in Article 9 TFEU and the need to 
incorporate employment and social protection-related considerations in the various EU policies and in Chapter X 




balanced.35 Nevertheless, and despite the discretion that the Member States enjoy in this area, 
they cannot undermine any economic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties or the Charter.36 
 
Moving on to its balancing exercise, the CJEU found that Article 5(3) of the Greek law 
could, prima facie, be read in conformity with both the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to conduct a business, which according to the CJEU ‘must be viewed in relation to its 
social function’.37 The only limitation being that a national measure cannot curtail a freedom’s 
essence, as was the case in Alemo-Herron.38 This was not the case here, where a procedural 
framework requiring a pre-authorization was imposed, without barring collective redundancies 
altogether.39 Article 30 of the Charter on the protection against unjustified dismissal was also 
applicable, thereby allowing restrictions on Article 16 of the Charter.40  
 
 Since the decisions of an undertaking in situations such as the one at issue could 
severely affect workers, and in the absence of relevant EU rules on their protection, provisions 
similar to the one contained in Article 5(3) of Law No. 1387/1983 were appropriate in order to 
ensure workers’ welfare.41 They were also necessary, as this objective could not be achieved 
through less onerous means.42 Contrary to the Advocate General’s suggestion, the CJEU found 
that, in principle, restrictions on the freedom of establishment and to conduct a business may 
be justified, in this sort of case.43  
 
 While the objectives underpinning the national law appeared compatible with the 
fundamental freedoms, the regime in place exceeded what is acceptable for the CJEU, by not 
being specific enough, something that might risk eliminating an undertaking’s freedoms.44 
Moreover, that lack of precision might negatively impact the effectiveness of the procedure’s 
judicial review by the national courts.45 The proportionality test, therefore, failed, and the 
                                                        
35 Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para. 75-78, recalling Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ 
Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union. 
36 Ibid., para. 79-81 and the case law cited therein. 
37 Ibid., para. 85, citing Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich, EU:C:2013:28. 
38 Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron and Others. 
39 Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para. 87-88. 
40 Ibid., para. 89. 
41 Ibid., para. 91-92. 
42 Ibid., para. 93. 
43 Ibid., para. 94. 
44 Ibid., para. 95-99, citing Case C-483/99 Commission v. France, EU:C:2002:327, para. 50, 51; and Case C-
326/07 Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2009:193, para. 51, 52. 




Greek legislation was found to be incompatible with both freedoms enshrined in Article 49 
TFEU and Article 16 of the Charter respectively.46 
 
 Thereafter, the second question dealing with the merits of the acute economic crisis and 
high unemployment levels as overarching social justifications was examined. In a situation 
where the practical effect of Directive 98/59/EC was bereaved by reason of national law, the 
afore-mentioned social justifications cannot be invoked and, consequently, alter this 
outcome.47 As for the freedom of establishment, there is no additional way of derogating from 
it other than with recourse to the balancing exercise identified above.48 These serious social 
reasons referring to purely domestic situations cannot do much - if anything - to alter the legal 




 The outcomes of both the Advocate General’s Opinion and the CJEU’s judgment do 
not differ substantially. In principle, Directive 98/59/EC does not preclude the national 
legislation in question, except for when its provisions render the application of the Directive 
practically impossible. Furthermore, the limitations that the Greek law imposes on the 
freedoms of establishment and to conduct a business cannot be proportionally justified by the 
rationale underpinning the regime in place, and any claims based on the severe welfare crisis 
ravaging a Member State cannot act as overarching justifications either. The bar continues to 
remain high for social justifications to pass the CJEU’s proportionality test in the context of 
the fundamental freedoms. This will come as no surprise, but instead is an embodiment of the 
well-known jurisprudence on the topic, which culminated in the Laval Quartet.49 Therefore, 
what is so noteworthy about this case that makes it distinguishable from the others? 
 
                                                        
46 Ibid., para. 100, 102-104. 
47 Ibid., para. 106. 
48 Ibid., para. 107. 
49 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers' Federation, Finnish Seamen's Union v. Viking Line ABP, OÜ 
Viking Line Eesti, EU:C:2007:772; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, avd. 1, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, EU:C:2007:809; Case C-346/06, 
Rechtsanwalt Dr. Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, EU:C:2008:189; and Case C-319/06, Commission v. 





 AGET Iraklis was decided almost a decade after the Laval Quartet.50 The latter stirred 
much debate, quite critical for the most part - at least from labour law scholars - on the hierarchy 
between economic and social values in the European edifice.51 While such narratives, might or 
might not be assimilated by the CJEU in its future decision-making, other, certainly more 
institutionalized developments should. To that end, 2009 marked the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which heralded the EU as a ‘competitive social market economy’ and endowed 
the Charter, presumably without excluding its social solidarity chapter, with equal status to the 
Treaties.  
 
Certainly, the introduction of these concepts at the core of the Union’s norms is not 
merely semantics; it normatively represents a move towards a more social Europe, an aim that 
should be considered in the CJEU’s future judgments. After all, Article 3(3) TEU declares that 
internal market policies must conform with the aims and objectives of the social market 
economy paradigm. This change did not go unnoticed by the CJEU, its importance was hinted 
at in two respective Advocate Generals’ Opinions.52 Nonetheless, the present judgment 
represents the first time that the CJEU has, per se, highlighted this occurrence.  
 
It is not only the introduction of social market economy that has been mentioned by the 
CJEU and its Advocate Generals. The Charter has also been invoked by the latter, in order to 
establish the existence of fundamental social rights, which might as well be directly effective.53 
The CJEU in itself has never gone that far, but it has, nonetheless, recognized that there are 
certain fundamental social rights, not mere principles, enshrined in the Charter.54 Perhaps, in 
the current post-Lisbon regime, such considerations, if assessed under the said context, would 
end up having a decisive role in the Court’s determination on the existence of proportionate 
justifications to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms.55 Nevertheless, these considerations 
have yet to substantially impact the CJEU’s jurisprudence. Despite that, and considering their 
                                                        
50 Ibid. 
51 E. Christodoulidis, ‘The European Court of Justice and “Total Market” Thinking’, 14 German Law Journal 
(2013), p. 2005. 
52 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-271/08 Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2010:183; and 
Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota, EU:C:2010:245.  
53 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak Case C-282/10 Dominguez, EU:C:2011:559; and Opinion of Advocate 
General Cruz Villalón in C-176/12 AMS, EU:C:2013:491. 
54 Case C-149/10 Chatzi, EU:C:2010:534, where the CJEU proclaimed the right to parental leave as a fundamental 
social right found in Article 33(2) of the Charter. 
55 As suggested vis-à-vis the freedom to conduct a business in the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in 




novelty, just acknowledging the new playing field could bring us a step closer to finding what 
Europe’s social market economy stands for.56 In that sense, the CJEU’s judgment in AGET 
Iraklis can be perceived as such a victory.  
 
The case at hand, in addition to the reasons mentioned supra, merits paying attention to 
the differences in reasoning between the Advocate General’s Opinion and the CJEU’s 
judgment concerning the importance of social considerations to the functioning of the internal 
market. In turn, this antithesis might recall not only the competing visions of Europe’s 
constitutional identity, but also the struggle between fundamental economic freedoms and 
fundamental social rights, which rose to fame in the post-Viking era. In this section, there will 
also be some reflections on the extenuating social reasons pleaded by Greece, especially in 
relation to the CJEU’s case law on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
 
A. The Rift Between the Advocate General and the CJEU 
 
1. The liberal Advocate General 
 
 What is striking about the Advocate General’s Opinion is that he chose not to build on 
the trend started by his peers post-Lisbon, as described above, by giving more serious 
consideration to the Union’s social dimension. Instead, the Opinion relied on a pro-market, 
neoliberal rationale, giving primacy to fundamental freedoms. For the Advocate General, the 
European Union ‘is based on a free market economy’,57 a statement that is redolent of the pre-
existing regime before the inclusion of the social market economy paradigm into the Treaties. 
If that development had not taken place, then nothing in the Opinion would have come as any 
surprise. 
 
In a free market economy, economic freedoms are, a priori, in a higher hierarchical 
position, and only very limited exceptions thereto are permissible, even when evaluated against 
social justifications, drawing analogies with Viking. In theory, such justifications could be 
accepted as derogations, but they neither enjoy equal standing to the freedoms affected, despite 
                                                        
56 S. Deakin, ‘In Search of the Social Market Economy’, in N. Bruun, K. Lörcher and I. Schömann, (eds.), The 
Lisbon Treaty and Social Europe (Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 19-43. 




the emergence of Social Europe and the rearranging of the EU’s priorities to accommodate 
this, nor is it easy for them to be practically upheld by the CJEU.58 Indeed, the relationship 
between the interests protected by the national measure on the one hand, and the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Charter on the other, does not appear to play any significant role.  
 
On the contrary, by invoking AMS, the Advocate General aimed to highlight the 
‘weaker’ power of the Charter’s social section vis-à-vis the freedom of establishment and its 
inextricable link to the freedom to conduct a business. Social rights are not strong enough on 
their own, and, thus need to be further specified in order for them to gain effectiveness.59 Article 
27 of the Charter, at issue in AMS, was perceived as being unrelated to the case’s proceedings, 
rendering Article 30 of the Charter on the protection from unjustified dismissals the sole 
relevant part of the Charter. This is, nonetheless, conceived in a similar halfway house position 
as its information and consultation counterpart. It represents a weaker right than the freedom 
to conduct a business under Article 16 of the Charter principle, which cannot bear much weight 
in the ensuing balancing exercise. 
 
 Thus, the only weapon left for workers is Directive 98/59, which aims to ensure a 
balance between the competing interests of employees and employers. This is translated into a 
ceiling on how far social considerations could go, not surprisingly so, if one considers that 
Advocate General Wahl emphasized the Directive’s internal market aim in a separate 
Opinion.60 Under this rationale, Member States must not act unilaterally to protect workers 
since this might ‘not take into account the employers’ situation’.61 While it is true that the 
Directive in question was enacted on the basis of both social and economic considerations, this 
led to rather deferential CJEU jurisprudence towards ‘the employer’s managerial prerogative 
and commercial power’;62 the fact that employers’ protection was over-stressed was 
inconsistent with settled case law of the CJEU underscoring the workers’ side.63 It also collides 
                                                        
58 C. Joerges, ‘A New Alliance of De-Legalisation and Legal Formalism? Reflections on Responses to the Social 
Deficit of the European Integration Project’, 19 Law and Critique (2008), p. 246; C. Kilpatrick, ‘Laval’s 
Regulatory Conundrum: Collective Standard-Setting and the Court’s New Approach to Posted Workers’, 34 
European Law Review (2009), p. 844. 
59 F. Dorssemont, ‘The Right to Information and Consultation in Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union’, 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2014), p. 704, 716. 
60 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-80/14 USDAW and Wilson, EU:C:2015:66. 
61 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-201/15 AGET Iraklis, para. 63. 
62 J. Kenner, EU Employment Law: From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond (Hart Publishing, 2002), p. 29. 





with classic labour law theories, whereby the worker is seen as the weaker party of the 
employment relationship, necessitating protective measures in their favour.64  
 
The Advocate General, by invoking Alemo-Herron to reinforce his view that 
employers’ interests merited enhanced protection, recalled neoliberal trajectories; protecting 
the interests of the employer can often be achieved to the detriment of workers’ protection, 
thus underplaying Directive’s 98/59 social part in a similar way that the Acquired Rights 
Directive was in the cited judgment.65 While employers’ and employees’ interests are not 
always irreconcilable, such an interpretation of secondary law, which partly aims at ensuring 
workers’ protection, essentially strips it out of the discretion given to Member States for 
enacting higher labour standards, by subjecting it to strict scrutiny vis-à-vis the interests of the 
employer.66 It may not be constitutionally problematic, since a piece of secondary EU law is 
subordinate to the economic freedoms contained in the Treaties and the Charter, yet such a 
proposition fails to encompass the social solidarity part of the Charter and Article 3(3) TEU’s 
social market economy paradigm, which should have at least resulted in a more flexible 
interpretation of the Member States’ discretion in this area. 
 
 After such argumentation, it is unsurprising that the three criteria of the Greek law were 
found to be neither appropriate nor necessary; in an arguably far-fetched scenario, they might 
even have led to the undertaking’s insolvency. The situation was not aided by Directive 
98/59/EC, whose tight interpretation does not leave much discretion to go beyond minimal 
protection levels. After all, ‘the idea of a balancing exercise is in fact a fallacy’,67 as if the 
Greek measure included only minimum standards, disturbing the exercise of any economic 
freedom would have been avoided.  
 
The Advocate General’s conclusion was in line with deterministic views on the 
inevitable superiority of the market element in the European project. So long as a case falls 
                                                        
64 L. Blades, ‘Employment at will vs. individual freedom: On limiting the abusive exercise of employer power’, 
67 Columbia Law Review (1967), p. 1404-. 
65 J. Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfers of Undertakings and the Protection 
of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law’, 42 Industrial Law Journal (2013), p. 434, 439-40; M. Bartl and C. Leone, 
‘Minimum Harmonisation after Alemo-Herron: The Janus Face of EU Fundamental Rights Review’, 11 European 
Constitutional Law Review (2015), p. 140. 
66 P. Syrpis and T. Novtiz, ‘The EU Internal Market and Domestic Labour Law: Looking Beyond Autonomy’, in 
A. Bogg et al. (eds.), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 301-302. 




within the remit of EU free movement law, then proportionately justified restrictions are the 
only possible limitations on fundamental freedoms; anything that impinges those could only 
be perceived as such.68 These perspectives might have held true in the past, but, nowadays, the 
aforementioned changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon must be integrated into the 
CJEU’s application of the balancing test, to give greater weight to social considerations, in 
order, for its reasoning to conform to the latest constitutional developments at EU level. 
 
2. The more socially-conscious CJEU 
 
 It is refreshing to see that the CJEU’s judgment was much more accommodating to 
social concerns. Despite sharing the peculiar reading of the Directive over-emphasizing 
employers’ interests over those of workers,69 the CJEU ended up being more open-minded 
towards the social justifications put forward. This is an interesting development, as in recent 
post-Lisbon case law this role was taken on by the Advocate Generals, who more often than 
not, recommended a reconsideration of the balancing exercise, so as to give more effect to 
welfare-related rationales.70 The social side of the acquis communautaire is accentuated, and 
play a larger role in the judgment, highlighting the legitimacy of the Greek prior-authorization 
regime.  
 
Although not fully exploited, the CJEU did not fail to mention in that regard, the 
Union’s aspirations to become a social market economy.71 This aspect of the EU’s 
constitutional reality allows the CJEU not only to tolerate, but to accept, at least as a theoretical 
possibility, that measures enacted to achieve such aims shall not constitute infringements of 
the fundamental freedoms. A harmonious co-existence of the Economic and Social 
Constitutions would therefore be in place. Unlike the Advocate General’s take on the relevance 
of Alemo-Herron, the CJEU found that the Greek measures did not in fact totally curtail the 
exercise of the economic freedoms in question.  
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Clearly, for the CJEU, social concerns had a much higher chances of being accepted as 
justifiable restrictions to the freedoms of establishment and to conduct a business, in 
comparison to the Advocate General’s Opinion. It was only on the technicalities of its wording 
and precision that the Greek provision failed the proportionality test. Nonetheless, this came 
after the CJEU had asserted that Article 5(3) of Law No. 1387/1983 would have otherwise been 
appropriate to serve its social purpose against the aforementioned freedoms. Is it an omen that 
the CJEU finally listened to the critics, and recalibrated, even if only marginally, the social 
compass of its jurisprudence?  
 
The CJEU’s pro-social attitude could also be explained by its generally sympathetic 
stance towards justifications based on workers’ protection as limitations to the freedom of 
establishment. These tend to be accepted as legitimate, only to be struck down by failing the 
proportionality test later on, meaning that the examined case might not be a novel one.72 Yet, 
this should not deflect attention from the fact that the CJEU, for the first time, contemplated 
welfare rationales as potentially successful justifications of restrictions on fundamental 
economic freedoms to a large extent. It also alluded, that in an amended form, so as to fulfil all 
limbs of the proportionality test, the Greek measure, often attacked in the course of the 
country’s economic adjustment programmes, could be compatible with both primary EU law 
as emanating from the Treaties and the Charter, but also with the objectives of Directive 
98/59/EC on collective redundancies. 
 
B. A(Nother) Case of Fundamental Social Rights Versus Fundamental Economic Freedoms? 
 
 While the particular issue here did not gain much traction, the connection between the 
national measures and the social provisions of the Charter having been dismissed by the 
Advocate General and overlooked by the CJEU, the value judgments undertaken in that regard 
by both actors cannot help but bring the balancing exercise between fundamental rights and 
fundamental freedoms into mind. For the purposes of the examined case, the balancing act 
takes place between welfare considerations, such as the protection of employment and workers 
on the one hand, and economic freedoms, such as those of establishment and to conduct a 
business, on the other hand.  
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 Despite being enshrined in the Union’s social acquis, social rights cannot act 
independently, but instead form part of the possible public interest justification that a Member 
State can plead in order to justify a potential restriction on a fundamental freedom. By doing 
so, the CJEU and the Advocate General alike, automatically render those subordinate to the 
exercise of the - primarily economic - fundamental freedoms, but also of the economic rights’ 
component of the Charter, in a similar way that the right to strike was in Viking.73  
 
They are seen as exceptions to the rule, and not as equal counterparts of the market 
freedoms, despite the Charter’s social solidarity chapter and the progress made in integrating 
social aspects throughout the recent Treaty amendments. As mentioned above, such an 
interpretation might appear to undermine any change at legislative and policy level, and has 
led to fierce criticisms of the proportionality-based approach undertaken by the CJEU, calling 
it ‘fundamentally flawed’, 74 and ‘a travesty of its former self’,75 due to the contempt shown 
towards welfare in the course of the balancing exercise.  
 
For the CJEU, however, path-dependence seems to hold strong, making it difficult for 
it to depart from its long-standing reasoning, which has set the bar too high for social 
justifications to satisfy the pertinent proportionality test in free movement cases, despite some 
bright moments in certain Advocate Generals’ Opinions, which have nevertheless failed to 
translate into path-departure.76 Under this framework, the pro-social attitude of the CJEU in 
AGET Iraklis might be one small step for the operation of the balancing exercise at the moment 
but could represent a giant leap for Social Europe if this is further built upon in the future. 
 
 
C. The Competing Visions of European Constitutionalism 
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More easily discernible through the contrasting argumentation of the two stakeholders 
is the fact that each represents, in a way, one of the distinct narratives in the literature of 
European Constitutionalism, broken down into its economic and social elements, and the 
tensions that arise among them. The Advocate General’s Opinion recalled the very beginning 
of the European Project, drawing on its ordoliberal origins, with their market-oriented 
approach, and the primacy given to the market’s demands, to which social considerations had 
to obey.77 Indeed according to this worldview, social justifications can only be construed as 
limited exceptions, and primacy must be given to economic interests. Social policy thus 
becomes not an independent actor, but merely a mechanism of the market, finding itself in an 
inferior position compared to any market-related right or freedoms. 
 
On the contrary, and despite the subordinated depiction of social rights in terms of the 
balancing exercise, the CJEU’s discourse seemed to allocate substantially more space in order 
to highlight their importance. They are no longer held hostage to market demands, but have the 
ability to bend the confines of economic imperatives. They gain their own independent 
legitimization, reinforced with the social reorientation of Europe post-1990s, and particularly 
post-Lisbon.78 It is this type of constitutionalism that would allow for national measures such 
as those in question in AGET Iraklis to justify restrictions on free movement.  
 
In practice, though, things are not quite there yet. Despite enjoying the CJEU’s 
recognition as serving legitimate (and for the most part appropriate) objectives, it is hard for 
the CJEU to find that they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those aims. Scharpf 
has written about the fundamental asymmetry of European Integration, whereby the highly 
harmonized aspects of the economic constitution retain the upper hand vis-à-vis the largely 
underdeveloped social one.79 Under those terms, Article 5(3) of Law No. 1387/1983 seems to 
have fallen victim to this asymmetry. It is an antagonistic relationship that might surface 
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between the Economic and Social Constitutions, yet the CJEU does not give ex ante 
unconditional primacy to the Economic one. 
 
C. Extenuating Circumstances for an EMU Member State under the ESM 
 
 Although neither the CJEU nor the Advocate General dedicate considerable space to 
the issue, making it of secondary rather than primary importance, there are still quite a few 
comments that can be made, especially as the extenuating circumstances put forward by Greece 
as quasi-force majeure justifications for the national legislation relate to serious social reasons, 
linked to the acute economic and financial crisis the country has faced since 2008. The 
consequences of the latter led Greece to enter into the ESM.  
 
The Advocate General appeared quite daring when answering this question, reciting 
Greece’s obligations under the ESM, and implying the necessity of an overhaul of the country’s 
labour market policies to render Greece more competitive in the global arena.80 From a social 
perspective, this cannot be well-received, particularly as it has yet to be proven how beneficial 
and sustainable constant deregulation may be. This viewpoint allows analogies to be drawn 
with the concept of downturn-austerity that some view implicit under the ESM, as if it has been 
normatively constitutionalized, with the CJEU declaring financial stability among the Union’s 
higher objectives in relation to Article 125 TFEU in its Pringle judgment.81 
 
The CJEU, on the other hand, adopted a much more legalistic reasoning in its judgment. 
It rejected Greece’s argument, that in the absence of any specific safeguard or break clauses in 
either the Treaties or the Directive, circumstantial reasons related to the situation in one 
Member State cannot act as justifications. By deciding in that particular way, the CJEU might 
have wished to avoid non-formalized justifications acting as Trojan horses, enabling Member 
States to avoid compliance with EU law. On a different note, it is welcomed  - if not hopeful - 
that the CJEU chose to abstain from value judgments on the reforms that Greece must 
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undertake as part of its financial obligations under the ESM, despite the measure in question 
having been targeted by the Troika.  
 
The CJEU accepted that, in theory, a prior authorization regime could be compatible 
with EU law, yet the CJEU chose not to give a precise answer as to how the national pre-
authorization regime can be reformed to fully comply with it. This, and especially the part of 
the judgment which hints that such measures could be part of Directive’s 98/59/EC most 
favourable clause, might give ammunition to the Greek side at the negotiation table, to maintain 
a revamped version of the scheme, and addresses concerns voiced against further deregulation 
in the context of austerity measures. On the other hand, its abstractness, might allow for the 
more precise, albeit deregulatory, authority of the bailout institutions to take over the measure’s 
suggested reform.  
 
The scenario of the Troika’s victory would make it hard for the measure to be 
challenged as part of Greece’s rescue deal. Precedence has shown that the CJEU is quite 
deferential towards such actions, with most of the preliminary references rejected as matters of 
national law,82 something that ex ante bars any possibility for interpreting provisions enacted 
under the various Memoranda of Understanding vis-à-vis social considerations.83 Yet, even in 
the rare instances where the CJEU might accept the admissibility of a preliminary reference on 
the matter, its previous rulings show that it tends to give precedence to the overarching 




 Quo vadis CJEU in the field of social considerations? The judgment of the CJEU in 
AGET Iraklis can be seen as a hopeful development. It showed a more accommodating 
judiciary, that takes into account social rights, yet it was cautious enough to still look after its 
precious fundamental freedoms. Despite the fact that the latter were drawn from both the 
Treaties and the Charter, this did not impede the CJEU from dedicating a respectable part of 
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its reasoning to defending and acknowledging social rationales as legitimate justifications to 
the former’s exercise, significantly departing from its more dismissive and settled case law. 
Perhaps finally, the CJEU has listened to the advocates of giving a more prominent position to 
the concept of social market economy and the social solidarity part of the Charter, especially 
in the post-Lisbon era. 
 
Interestingly enough, the past jurisprudence of the CJEU found a stronghold in the 
Advocate General’s Opinion, as if the roles have been reversed in this case, considering the 
more accommodating stance exhibited towards welfare by Advocate Generals in previous 
cases. For him, economic interests should come above and beyond everything else. The 
economic constitution does not have any space for the social one, which can only be 
subordinate to the former. Amidst such an anti-social rhetoric, the CJEU’s use of arguments 
linked to workers’ protection comes as a ray of hope for the future. It is the CJEU, together 
with the political arena of the Union, that has been given the arduous task of balancing these 
antithetic interests.85 If Social Europe is to emerge in a more substantial way following the 
latest reforms, then it is partly the CJEU’s task to contribute to its development. Until such 
ambitions fully materialize, however, one can only hope that the CJEU will not digress from 
this aim. 
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